Abstract-Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems.
• "One group of agents, using a certain set of commands, is non-interfering with another group of agents if what the first group does with those commands has no effect on what the second group can see." Then information leakage from a group of agents to another group of agents is understood as interference of the first group with the second group, and security is defined as noninterference of the agents with sensitive information with those malicious agents. In the original formulation [12] of noninterference, its system model is a deterministic automaton. This model has been generalised to a nondeterministic automaton by Sutherland [27] and McCullough [19] and further to a probabilistic automaton by Gray [14] .
This paper aims at extending further the noninterference formalism so that it can be used to reason about informationflow security of quantum systems. A quantum system is in a sense a probabilistic system, but the theory of probabilistic noninterference [14] cannot be directly applied to it due to the following two reasons: 1) In a quantum system a probability distribution of outputs only appears after a certain measurement. Any observation about a classical or probabilistic system by an agent does not disturb the state of the observed system and thus has no interference with other agents. However, a basic postulate of quantum mechanics stipulates that the only way for acquiring information about a quantum system is quantum measurement, which will alter the state of the observed system. Thus, interference between different agents will be introduced during observation on quantum systems. 2) The computational steps of a quantum system are governed by unitary operators or more generally superoperators, which are essentially different from stochastic matrices that are commonly used to model the dynamics of probabilistic systems. In other words, the mathematical description of commands executed by an agent in a classical or probabilistic systems is very different from that in a quantum system.
To appropriately incorporate quantum features into the noninterference formalism, we define a system model in terms of quantum automata [20] . Di Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky [7] observed that absolute noninterference can hardly ever be achieved in real systems, and thus they proposed a novel notion of approximate noninterference based on a quantitative measure of process behaviour equivalence. The non-appropriateness of absolute noninterference is even truer in the quantum case because quantum gates form a continuum and noise in their physical implementation is unavoidable. So, we define a quantitative version of noninterference (or approximate noninterference) for quantum systems, following Di Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky [7] . (A notion of approximate behaviour equivalence was also adopted by the authors in their work on both classical and quantum process algebras [34] , [32] , [33] , [9] .)
The main technical contribution of this paper are:
• Unwinding proof technique: It is often hard to establish noninterference security because noninterference is defined as a property over sequences of commands of arbitrary length. A unwinding technique was proposed by Goguen and Meseguer [13] , which can prove noninterference by checking only certain singlestep conditions. This technique was generalised by Rushby [24] and van der Meyden [30] to the case of intransitive noninterference. We further generalise this technique and provide a method for estimating the upper bound of insecurity degree of quantum system. • Compositionality of security: A research line on compositionality of security was initiated by McCullough [19] and recently systemised by Mantel [18] , showing that secure components with appropriate interface can be hooked up to form a secure system. As a quantum generalisation of their compositionality theorems, we prove that the insecurity degree of a composed quantum system does not exceed the sum of the insecurity degrees of their components provided no entanglement exists between those components. As an application of the proposed formalism, we consider access control of quantum data. The operating systems of all modern computers include certain form of access control to protect confidential data. Access control of quantum data will certainly be an important issue in the design of an operating system for future quantum computers. The simplest access control policy is usually defined in terms of access control matrix, which specifies the access rights of agents to individual storage locations. A quantum access control matrix is much more complicated than its classical counterpart due to a subtle difference between classical and quantum information:
• "1 + 1 < 2": Access to the quantum information stored in a composite AB system is not granted by access to the information stored in subsystem A and access to that in subsystem B (see Example 6.1). More precisely, a quantum access control matrix has to specify the access rights of agents not only to individual storage locations but also to different combinations of individual locations. Rushby [24] showed by the unwinding technique that security of access control can be properly interpreted in the noninterference formalism with the Reference Monitor Assumptions. As a quantum generalisation of Rushby's result [24] , we show that the insecurity degree of quantum access control is bounded by a linear function of the degree that the Reference Monitor Assumptions are satisfied.
The paper is organised as follows. Since the majority of Computer Security Foundations community may have no background in quantum computation, we briefly review its basics including the mathematical formalism of the state space and dynamics of a quantum system and quantum measurement in Sec. II; for more details we refer to [21] . Another purpose of Sec. II is to fix notations used in the later sections. The automata model of quantum systems and a noninterference measure in such a model are introduced in Sec. 3.1. In Sec. IV, we define the core notion -insecurity degree of quantum systems -in terms of the noninterference measure, and the unwinding technique for proving security is generalised to the quantum setting. A compositionality theorem for quantum security is established in Sec. V. The security properties of access control of quantum data are examined in Sec. VI. A brief conclusion is drawn in Sec. VIII, including several problems for further research. For the readability, all the proofs of theorems are not included in this paper, but the reader can find them at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.6804v1.pdf.
II. BASICS OF QUANTUM THEORY

A. Hilbert Spaces
According to a basic postulate of quantum mechanics, the state space of a quantum system is represented by a Hilbert space. In this paper (except Sec. VII -Related Work), we only consider finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, which are indeed complex vector spaces with inner product. We assume the reader is familiar with the notion of vector space in Linear Algebra. An inner product over a vector space H is a mapping ·|· : H × H → C satisfying the following properties:
1) ϕ|ϕ ≥ 0 with equality if and only if |ϕ = 0; 2) ϕ|ψ = ψ|ϕ * ; and 3) ϕ|λ 1 ψ 1 + λ 2 ψ 2 = λ 1 ϕ|ψ 1 + λ 2 ϕ|ψ 2 for any |ϕ , |ψ , |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 ∈ H and for any λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ C, where C is the field of complex numbers, and * stands for the conjugate of complex numbers. Sometimes, we write (|ϕ , |ψ ) for the inner product ϕ|ψ . A vector |ψ is called a unit vector if ψ|ψ = 1. A pure state of a quantum system is described by a unit vector in its state space. Two vectors |ϕ and |ψ are said to be orthogonal, written |ϕ ⊥|ψ , if ϕ|ψ = 0. A family {|ψ i } n−1 i=0 of unit vectors is called an orthonormal basis of H if 1) |ψ i ⊥|ψ j for any i = j; and 2) |ψ = n−1 i=0 ψ i |ψ |ψ i for all |ψ ∈ H. In this case, H is said to be n−dimensional, and each element |ψ of H can be represented by a column vector |ψ = (a 0 , ..., a n−1 )
T , where a i = ψ i |ψ for 0 ≤ i < n, and T stands for transpose. Example 2.1: Quantum bit, or qubit for short, is the quantum counterpart of the bit in classical computation. The state space of qubits is the 2−dimensional Hilbert space
The inner product of |ψ = α|0 + β|1 and |ϕ = α |0 + β |1 is ψ|ϕ = α * α + β * β .
The vectors
form an orthonormal basis of H 2 , called its computational basis. A qubit can be in the basis states |0 and |1 as well as their superpositions
where |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1, such as
The state space of a composite quantum system is defined to be the tensor product of the state spaces of its subsystems. Let H i be a Hilbert space with {|ψ ij } as an orthonormal basis for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the tensor product of H i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the Hilbert space with {|ψ 1j1 ...ψ njn } as an orthonormal basis, i.e.
where |ψ 1j1 · · · ψ njn = |ψ 1j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ njn is the product of basis states |ψ 1j1 , ..., |ψ njn of the subsystems. In particular, if
The state space of two-qubits is H ⊗2 2 . A two-qubit system can be in a separable state |ψ = |ψ 1 ⊗ |ψ 2 , where |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 are one-qubit states, e.g. |00 , |01 , |1+ , | + − . It can also be in an entangled state, i.e. a state that cannot be written as the product of two one-qubit states; for example, the EPR (Einstein-PodolskyRosen) pair or Bell state
is a maximally entangled quantum state of two qubits that are usually thought to be spatially separated, but exhibit strong correlations.
B. Density Operators
We also assume the reader is familiar with the notion of linear operator. If {|i } n−1 i=0 is a (fixed) orthonormal basis of an n−dimensional Hilbert space H, then an operator A on it can be represented by n × n matrix A = (A ij ) where the entries A ij are defined by
A ji |j for every 0 ≤ i < n. For any vectors |ϕ , |ψ in H, we often write ϕ|A|ψ for the inner product (|ϕ , A|ψ ) of |ϕ and A|ψ . An operator A on H is said to be positive if ψ|A|ψ ≥ 0 for all states |ψ ∈ H. The trace of an operator A is defined to be
where {|ψ i } is an orthonormal basis of H, and ψ i |A|ψ i is the inner product of |ψ i and A|ψ i . If the operator is represented by an n × n matrix A = (A ij ), then its trace is the sum of the entries on the diagonal of A, i.e.
A mixed state of a quantum system can be described as a density operator when it is not completely known. Let {|ψ i } be a family of states in H. If a system is in state |ψ i with probability p i for each i, and i p i = 1, then the state of the system is represented by
where the outer product |ψ i ψ i | of |ψ and itself is an operator defined as follows: (|ψ i ψ i |)|ϕ = ψ i |ϕ |ψ i for each |ϕ ∈ H. We say that ρ is a mixed state generated by the ensemble {(p i , |ψ i )} of pure states. A density operator ρ on a Hilbert space H is defined to be a positive operator with tr(ρ) = 1. An operator is a density operator if and only if it can be generated by an ensemble of pure states. In particular, we identify a pure state |ψ with the density operator |ψ ψ|, which is the outer product of |ψ and itself.
Example 2.3: The mixed state of a qubit generated by ensemble {(
C. Unitary Operators
For an operator A on H, if another operator A † satisfies (|ϕ , A|ψ ) = (A † |ϕ , |ψ ) for all |ϕ , |ψ , then A † is called the adjoint of A, where (|χ , |ζ ) stands for the inner produce χ|ζ . An operator U is called a unitary operator if U † U = I H , where and in the sequel I H stands for the identity operator on H. The basic postulate of quantum mechanics about evolution of systems may be stated as follows: Suppose that the states of a closed quantum system at times t 0 and t are |ψ 0 and |ψ , respectively. Then they are related to each other by a unitary operator U which depends only on the times t 0 and t:
This postulate can be reformulated in the language of density operators as follows. The state ρ of a closed quantum system at time t is related to its state ρ 0 at time t 0 by a unitary operator U which depends only on the times t and t 0 :
The controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate is a unitary operator on two qubits:
where I, 0 are 2×2 unit and zero matrices, respectively, and
is the NOT gate. The CNOT gate can produce entanglement:
meaning that separable state | + 0 = |+ |0 is transformed to EPR pair |β 00 .
D. Super-Operators
A quantum computing or communication system is often not a closed system because it may suffer from unwanted interactions from the environment. The dynamics of an open quantum system cannot be described by a unitary operator, and a popular mathematical formalism of the dynamics is the notion of super-operator. A super-operator on a Hilbert space H is a linear operator E from the space of linear operators on H into itself, which satisfies the following two conditions: 1) tr[E(ρ)] ≤ 1 for each density operator ρ;
2) Complete positivity: for any extra Hilbert space H R , (I R ⊗ E)(A) is positive provided A is a positive operator on H R ⊗H, where I R is the identity operation on H R . If condition 1) is strengthened to tr[E(ρ)] = 1 for all density operators ρ, then E is said to be trace-preserving. In this paper, we only consider trace-preserving super-operators. For any unitary operator U , if we define E(ρ) = U ρU † for all ρ, then U can be seen as a special super-operator E.
Example 2.5: The bit flip channel is widely used in quantum communication. This channel flips the state of a qubit from |0 to |1 and vice versa, with probability 1 − p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. It is described by the super-operator E on the 2−dimensional Hilbert space H 2 , defined as follows:
for all density operator ρ, where E 0 = √ pI, E 1 = √ 1 − pX, and I, X are the 2 × 2 unit matrix and the NOT gate, respectively. For example, if ρ is given by Eq. (1), then it is transformed by E to another density operator E(ρ) = 
E. Quantum Measurements
To acquire information about a quantum system, a measurement must be performed on it. In quantum computing, measurement is usually used to read out a computational result. A quantum measurement on a system with state space H is described by a collection {M λ } of operators satisfying the normalisation condition:
where M λ are called measurement operators, and the indices λ stand for the measurement outcomes. If the state of a quantum system is |ψ immediately before the measurement, then the probability that result λ occurs is
and the state of the system after the measurement is
We can also formulate the quantum measurement postulate in the language of density operators. If the state of a quantum system was ρ immediately before measurement {M λ } is performed on it, then the probability that result λ occurs is
, and the state of the system after the measurement is
Example 2.6: The measurement on a qubit in the computational basis {|0 , |1 } is M = {M 0 , M 1 }, where
If we perform M on a qubit in (mixed) state ρ given in Eq. (1), then the probability that we get outcome 0 is
and the probability of outcome 1 is p(1) = 1 6 . In the case that the outcome is 0, the qubit will be in state |0 after the measurement, and in the case that the outcome is 1, it will be in state |1 .
F. POVM Measurements
In defining noninterference, agents observe the system only at the end, and thus the post-measurement state of the system is of little interest. The Positive-Operator Valued Measure (POVM for short) formalism is especially suited to the analysis of noninterference. A POVM measurement on Hilbert space H consists of a family of positive operators {E λ } such that the normalisation condition:
If it is performed on a system in pure state |ψ , then the probability of outcome λ is p(λ) = ψ|E λ |ψ ;
and if the system is in mixed state ρ before measurement, then the probability of outcome λ is
Each ordinary quantum measurement {M λ } defined in Subsec. II-E can be seen as a special POVM measurement if we put
, where I is the identity operator on the 2−dimensional Hilbert space. Then {E 1 , E 2 , E 3 } is a POVM measurement. If we perform it on a qubit in the state ρ given in Eq. (1), then the probabilities of outcomes 1, 2 and 3 are, respectively,
III. NONINTERFERENCE IN QUANTUM SYSTEMS
A
. An Automata Model of Quantum Systems
Following Goguen and Meseguer's original formulation [12] , one of the popular system models used in the studies of noninterference has been automata. A probabilistic automata model was employed by Gray [14] in his work on probabilistic (non)interference. Here, we introduce an automata model for quantum systems. Definition 3.1: A quantum system is a 6−tuple
where: 1) H is a Hilbert space, and it is the state space of the system; 2) ρ 0 is a density operator in H, and it is the initial state; 3) A is a set of agents; 4) C is a set of commands; 5) do = {E a,c |a ∈ A and c ∈ C}, and for each a ∈ A and for each c ∈ C, E a,c is a super-operator on H, specifying how states are updated by agent a executing command c; 6) measure = {M a |a ∈ A}, and for each a ∈ A, M a is a set of POVM measurements on H, and intuitively, M a consists of all POVM measurements that agent a is allowed to perform. The above automata model is defined in a way much more general than that in the majority of quantum automata literature, for example [20] , where only pure states, unitary operators and ordinary (even projective) quantum measurements are considered. Here, we work with the language of density operators (mixed states), super-operators are employed to specify the executions of commands, and POVM measurements are used to describe agents' observation. The major motivation for such a general model is that density operators, super-operators and POVM measurements are commonly adopted in quantum information theory, see for example [21] , Chapter 12. We hope that our results presented in this paper can be smoothly incorporated with quantum information theory to analyse security of quantum computing and communication systems. On the other hand, density operators (mixed states) and super-operators have also been used in quantum computation. For example, Aharonov, Kitaev and Nisan [3] proposed a quantum circuit model with mixed states in which the issues of measurements in the middle of the computation, decoherence, noise and probabilistic subroutines can be conveniently dealt with; Zuliani [35] further introduced quantum programming methodology with mixed states using his programming language qGCL [26] .
Several essential differences between classical and quantum systems deserve careful explanations. First, the state space of a classical automaton is usually assumed to be discrete and even finite. In this paper, we only consider finite-dimensional quantum automata. But even so, their state Hilbert spaces are a continuum and thus deem-tobe infinite. Second, for simplicity, the outcomes of agents' observations were assumed to be deterministic in the system models of classical and probabilistic noninterference considered in [12] , [14] , [19] , [27] . However, such an assumption is no longer reasonable in the quantum case because an observation on a quantum system is always done through a quantum measurement which in principle cannot give a deterministic outcome but only a probability distribution of possible outcomes. In addition, an agent may be allowed to observe the system with different measurements which will give different distributions of outcomes.
Before going ahead, we need to fix some notations. We write Σ * for the set of all finite sequences of elements in
* , the length of α is |α| = n. We write α(i] for the head α 1 α 2 · · · α i of α for every i ≤ n. Also, we write
for every density operator ρ in H.
B. Measurement Distance between Density Operators
Noninterference is defined through a group of agents' nondiscrimination between the final states of the system with and without another group of agents' actions. In the quantum case, observation outcomes are always represented by the probability distributions determined by the involved measurements. So, we first need a distance to measure the difference between two distributions. Let X be a finite or countably infinite set. A probability distribution over X is a mapping p : X → [0, 1] such that x∈X p(x) = 1. For each event E ⊆ X, the probability of E is given by
For any two probability distributions p and q over X, their distance is defined to be
It is easy to see that
This equality indicates that the distance does not depends on the cardinality of the sample space X. The above distance between probability distributions can be naturally generalised to a pseudo distance between density operators through quantum measurements. Recall that a pseudo distance over a set X is a function d :
for all x, y, z ∈ X. If d(x, y) = 0 implies x = y, then d is called a distance. Let E = {E λ |λ ∈ Λ} be a POVM measurement on H. Then for any density operator ρ in H, we can define a probability distribution p E (ρ) = p E (ρ, ·) over the measurement outcomes Λ by
Now we consider a family M of POVM measurements. Definition 3.2: The pseudo distance defined by M is given by
for all density operators ρ and σ.
Note that the distance d M is defined with respect to not only a single measurement but a family M of measurements. This is because the same agent may be allowed to observe a quantum system in different ways; for example, he can use the X measurement M = {|+ +|, |− −|} or the Z measurement M = {|0 0|, |1 1|}, where X and Y are the Pauli's matrices (see [21] , Sec. 2.1.3). Intuitively, d M (ρ, σ) measures the difference between ρ and σ that can be detected by POVM measurements in M. It is worth noting that in general d M is only a pseudo distance but not a distance; for example, if M consists of only the Z measurement M = {|0 0|, |1 1|}, i.e. the measurement in the computational basis, ρ = |+ +| and σ =
A distance between density operators widely used in quantum information theory is trace distance. Recall from [21] , Sec. 9.2 that for any density operators ρ and σ, their trace distance is defined by
where |A| = √ A † A is the positive square root of A † A for linear operator A. The following theorem establishes a connection between trace distance and distance defined by measurements.
Theorem 3.1:
where the supremum is over all POVM measurements. The above theorem can be conveniently stated in terms of the distance introduced in Definition 3.2: if we take M to be the set of all POVM measurements, then d(ρ, σ) = d M (ρ, σ).
C. (Non)interference Degree
To present the definition of (non)interference degree, we need several more notations. If G ⊆ A is a group of agents, D ⊆ C is a set of commands, and α = α 1 α 2 · · · α n ∈ (A×C) * , then following the literature [24] , [30] on classical noninterference, we write purge G,D (α) for the subsequence of α obtained by deleting those α i = (a i , c i ) with a i ∈ G and c i ∈ D; that is, c) with a ∈ G and c ∈ D, α i otherwise.
We will simply write purge G (·) for purge G,C (·). For each agent a ∈ A, we write d a = d Ma for the pseudo distance defined by the set M a of the POVM measurements allowed to be performed by a.
Definition
Intuitively, the larger is Int(G 1 , D|G 2 ), the more agents G 1 with commands D interfere with agents G 2 . In particular, if G 1 with D does not interfere with G 2 , that is,
for all α ∈ (A × C) * and for all a ∈ G 2 , then Int(G 1 , D|G 2 ) = 0. Conversely, Int(G 1 , D|G 2 ) = 0 does not necessarily imply Eq. (5) because d a may not be a distance but only a pseudo distance. In this case, the difference between E α (ρ 0 ) and E purge G 1 ,D (α) (ρ 0 ) cannot be detected by agents in G 2 using the quantum measurements allowed for them. We will simply write Int(G 1 |G 2 ) for Int(G 1 , C|G 2 ) where all commands from C are allowed. If Int(G 1 , D|G 2 ) = 0, then we write G 1 , D : |G 2 . Furthermore, we will simply write G 1 :
The following proposition considers a special case where agents have the full capacity of measurements, and it follows immediately from Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.1: If each agent a ∈ G 2 can perform any POVM measurement; that is, M a is the set of all POVM measurements on H, then
To illustrate the notion defined above, we give a simple example.
Example 3.1: We consider a system with two qubits. So its state space is H ⊗2 2 , where H 2 is the 2−dimensional Hilbert space (see Example 2.1). There are two agents Alice and Bob: A = {Alice, Bob}. They are allowed to perform the measurement in the computational basis (see Example 2.6) on the first and second qubits, respectively:
where M i stands for the computational basis measurement on the ith qubit for i = 1, 2. The initial state is assumed to be |ψ 0 = |00 .
1) Isolated Alice and Bob:
If there is only one command R x (θ): C = {R x (θ)}, and when Alice (resp. Bob) execute R x (θ), she (resp. he) rotate the first (resp. second) qubit by an angle θ about the x−axis of the Bloch sphere (see Example 2.4), then the following claim is obvious:
• Claim: Alice : |Bob and Bob : |Alice; that is, Alice does not interfere with Bob, and vice versa. 2) Adding one-way CNOT: Now we add the CNOT gate (see Example 2.4) into the command set and put C = {R x (θ), CN OT }. Suppose that when both Alice and Bob executes the command CN OT , the controlled-NOT transformation is performed with the first qubit as the control qubit and the second as the target qubit. Then we have:
• Claim 1: Bob, R x (θ) : |Alice; that is,
Bob with rotation about x−axis does not interfere with Alice. that is, Alice with either rotation about x−axis or controlled-NOT interferes with Bob. To prove Claim 1, we notice that each α ∈ (A × C) * is a sequence of the following actions:
• B 1 : Alice execute R x (θ) on the first qubit; • B 2 : Bob executes R x (θ) on the second qubit; • B 3 : Alice or Bob executes CN OT with the first qubit as the control qubit and the second as the target qubit. It is obvious that B 1 and B 2 commute: B 1 B 2 = B 2 B 1 . Also, it follows from Eq. (4.39) in [21] that B 2 and B 3 commute. Suppose that Bob executes R x (θ) in α for n times. Then we can move all R x (θ) executed by Bob to the end of α and obtain
where purge(α) = purge Bob,Rx(θ) (α) is obtained by deleting all R x (θ) executed by Bob from α. We write |ψ , |ψ , |ϕ for the states after the system performs α, α , and purge(α), respectively. Then |ϕ can be written in the following form: |ϕ = |0 |ϕ 0 +|1 |ϕ 1 , and it holds that
Finally, Alice measures the first qubit of |ϕ and |ψ in the computational basis, she gets the same probability distribution:
The state of the system after α is executed is |ϕ = (cos θ|0 − i sin θ|1 )|0 , and the state after purge Bob,CN OT (α) is executed is
If Alice measures the first qubit of |ϕ and |ψ in the computational basis, then the probability distributions of outcomes are
respectively. This implies Claim 2. To prove Claim 3, consider action sequence α = (Alice, R x (θ)) (Alice, CN OT ). The state becomes
after executing α, and it does not change after executing purge Alice,Rx(θ) (α) = (Alice, CN OT ). If Bob measure the second qubit of |ψ and |ψ 0 in the computational basis, then the probability distributions are
respectively. So,
Similarly, we can prove Int(Alice, CN OT |Bob) > 0. 3) Adding two-way CNOT: Finally, we reverse the direction of the CNOT executed by Bob: Suppose that when Bob executes the command CNOT, the second qubit is used as the control qubit and the first qubit is the target. The direction executed by Alice is unchanged. Then we have:
that is, Alice always interferes with Bob, and vice versa. The proof of this claim is similar to that of the above Claims 2 and 3. The above example indicates that the CNOT gate may cause information leaking in quantum computing. The reason is that certain entanglement between Alice and Bob is created by the CNOT gate.
IV. SECURITY POLICIES
Information-flow security policies specify how can information flows from one agent to another. We first recall the formal definition of security policy from the literature [24] , [30] on classical information-flow security.
Definition 4.1: A policy is a reflexive relation between agents:
⊆ A × A. Intuitively, a b means that actions of agent a are permitted to interfere with agent b or information is permitted to flow from agent a to agent b.
Since security policies about a system are only relevant to the rights of agents but not the physical operations in the system such as evolution and observation, it is reasonable to adopt the same definition of policy for classical and quantum systems. Now we can define the notion of security for quantum systems with respect to a given policy based on noninterference. To do so, we need an additional notation. For any agent a ∈ A, we write a = {b ∈ A|b a} for the set of agents from who information cannot flow to agent a.
A. Unbounded-Time Security Definition 4.2:
The insecurity degree of system S with respect to policy is
Intuitively, Int( a|a) is the degree that the agents, from whom the policy specifies that information cannot flow to agent a, interfere with a. K(S, ) takes the supremum of Int( a|a) over all agents a ∈ A, and thus measures the global degree that an agent may interfere with another agent although information flow from the former to the latter is not allowed by the policy . Therefore, K(S, ) can be understood as the degree that system S is insecure with respect to policy . The smaller the value of K(S, ) is, the more secure the system S is. In particular, if K(S, ) = 0, then we say that S is secure with respect to . Example 4.1: We extend Example 3.1 by adding a new agent Charles, so the agent set is A = {Alice, Bob, Charles}. Consider the security policy defined by Alice Bob Charles. The system is expanded to include the third qubit, and the state space is then H ⊗3 2 . The initial state is |000 . Alice, Bob and Charles can perform the measurement in the computational basis on the first, second and third qubit, respectively. 1) Let the command set is C = {R x (θ)}. The executions of R x (θ) by Alice and Bob are the same as in Example 3.1, and Charles executes R x (θ) on the third qubit. It follows immediately from Example 3.1 1) that K(S, ) = 0; that is, S is secure with respect to . 2) Let the command set C = {R x (θ), CN OT }. When
Alice executes CN OT , the controlled-NOT transformation is performed with the first qubit as the control qubit and the second as the target, and when Bob executes CN OT , the controlled-NOT is performed with the second qubit as the control qubit and the third as the target. Charles is not allowed to execute CN OT , or equivalently, when Charles executes CN OT , nothing happens. Then it follows from Example 3.1 2) that
and the system S is not secure with respect to policy when θ = 0, η. Unwinding is a powerful proof technique for noninterference security of classical systems. We can extend the unwinding technique to quantum systems so that it can be used to estimate a upper bound of insecurity degree K(S, ). A density operator in H is said to be reachable in system S if there exists action sequence α ∈ (A × C) * such that ρ = E α (ρ 0 ). Then the first version of unwinding theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.1: (Unwinding I) If for each agent a ∈ A, there exists an equivalence relation a ∼ on reachable density operators satisfying the following conditions:
for all c ∈ C, then we have: K(S, ) ≤ sup{d a (ρ, σ)|ρ and σ are reachable, ρ a ∼ σ, and a ∈ A}.
Eq. (7) gives a upper bound of the insecurity degree K(S, ) under the conditions of Step consistency and Local respect of . The reader who is familiar with the classical unwinding technique may wonder that Observation consistence seems missing. Indeed, it is incorporated into the right-hand side of Eq. (7). In particular, if the equivalence relations a ∼, a ∈ A satisfy the above conditions of Step consistency, Local respect of and (7) implies that S is secure with respect to .
It is known that unwinding proof technique is complete for classical noninterference security [24] , [30] . The next theorem shows that the unwinding proof technique presented in Theorem 4.1 is complete for absolute security of quantum systems. 
B. Bounded-Time Security
Note that the length of action sequence α in Eq. (4) can be arbitrary. Thus, in the definition equation (6) of insecurity degree K(S, ), the time used by malicious agents to detect sensitive information is unlimited. We now consider a bounded-time variant of Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.3: Let t be a nonnegative real number. Then the degree that system S is t−bounded insecure with respect to policy is
Intuitively, K t (S, ) measure the insecurity degree of system S with respect to policy under the assumption that the running time of the system does not exceed t. It is obvious that K t (S, ) ≤ K t (S, ) if t ≤ t . If particular, if K t (S, ) = 0, then we say that S is secure with respect to within time t. We have a unwinding proof technique for bounded-time security too. Theorem 4.3: (Unwinding II) Let s , o , l be nonnegative real numbers. If for each agent a ∈ A, there exists a pseudodistance δ a between reachable density operators satisfying the following conditions:
• Approximate step consistency:
for all b ∈ A and c ∈ C, and for all ρ, σ; • Approximate observation consistency:
for all c ∈ C, and for all ρ, σ, then we have:
A upper bound of bounded-time insecurity degree K t (S, ) is given by Eq. (8) . The next theorem derives a lower bound of unbounded-time insecurity degree K(S, ) through bounded-time insecurity degree K t (S, ).
Theorem 4.4: (Weak Completeness of Unwinding II) There exists a family δ a , a ∈ A of pseudo-distance on reachable density operators satisfying the following conditions:
• Step consistency:
for all b ∈ A and c ∈ C, and for all ρ, σ; • Observation consistency:
for all ρ, σ;
• Bounded local respect of :
and ρ is reachable}.
The lower bound of insecurity degree K(S, ) in Eq. (9) can be seen as a weak completeness of the unwinding technique presented in Theorem 4.3. In particular, the above theorem implies: if S is secure with respect to ; that is, K(S, ) = 0, then there exists a family δ a , a ∈ A of pseudo-distances on reachable density operators satisfying the above Step and Observation consistency and the following:
• Local respect of : b a ⇒ δ a (ρ, E b,c (ρ)) = 0 for all c ∈ A and for all ρ.
C. Strong Security
Different from classical systems, the state of a quantum system is often not completely known and thus the system is in a mixed state defined by a statistical ensemble. Some stronger insecurity degrees will be useful when we consider mixtures of initial states. Let ρ be a density operator, {p i } a probability distribution, and ρ i a density operator for every i. If ρ = i p i ρ i , then ρ is called a mixture of ensemble {(p i , ρ i )} of density operators.
Before presenting the definition of strong insecurity degree, we have to introduce a notation. Let S = H, ρ 0 , A, C, do, measure , and let ρ 0 be a density operator. We write S[ρ 0 ] for the new system obtained by replacing the initial state ρ 0 in S by another initial state ρ 0 ; that is, 
2) Let t be a positive real number. Then the strong t−bounded insecurity degree SK t (S, ) of S with respect to is defined by Eq. (10) with K substituted by K t .
V. COMPOSITIONALITY OF SECURITY
The purpose of this section is to examine security of a system composed of a collection of subsystems. We consider two quantum systems S = H, ρ 0 , A, C, do, measure ,
We can assume that C ∩ C = ∅ without any loss of generality because the commands in C are executed on the component S, whereas the commands in C are executed on the different component S . However, it is allowed that A∩A = ∅ because the same agent may be granted to access both components S and S .
Definition 5.1: The composition of S and S is defined to be the quantum system
where 1) Do = {F a,c |a ∈ A ∪ A and c ∈ C ∪ C },
if a ∈ A and c ∈ C , I H⊗H if a ∈ A \ A and c ∈ C , or a ∈ A \ A and c ∈ C;
To simplify presentation, a little bit of notation abuse was allowed in the defining equation of O a ; for example, if E ∈ M a and a ∈ A, then E is a measurement on the whole system when it is considered in S, but it is a measurement on a subsystem S when it is considered in S ⊗ S .
We also consider the combination of two security policies. To this end, we need a notation. Let R ⊆ X ×X be a binary relation on X, and let Y ⊆ X. Then we write R|Y for the restriction of R on Y ; that is, R|Y = {(x, y) ∈ Y × Y : xRy}.
Definition 5.2: Let be a policy for agents A and a policy for agents A .
1) If
|A ∩ A = |A ∩ A , then we say that and are compatible.
2) The union of and is the policy ∪ on agents A ∪ A . Now we are ready to prove that security of quantum systems is compositional.
Theorem 5.1: If and are compatible, then we have:
. The above theorem shows that the insecurity degree of a composed system does not exceed the sum of the insecurity degrees of its component systems. In particular, if S and S are secure with respect to and , respectively (within time t), then S⊗S is secure with respect to ∪ (within time t).
The composition of quantum systems in Definition 5.1 is indeed a direct product in which the component systems are entirely independent to each other except that some agent can access different components. We can introduce a more general notion of composition where component quantum systems can be hooked up more tightly. To define it, we need several auxiliary notions. Recall from [21] that the partial trace tr H over H is a mapping from density operators in H ⊗ H to density operators in H. It is defined by
for all |ϕ 1 , |ϕ 2 ∈ H 1 and |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 ∈ H , and it is extended to all density operators in H ⊗ H by linearity. Let ρ be a density operator in H and σ a density operator in H ⊗ H . If tr H (σ) = ρ, then σ is called an extension of ρ in H ⊗ H . Let E be a super-operator on H and F a super-operator on H ⊗ H . We say that F is a cylindrical extension of E on in
Definition 5.3: A generalised composition of S and S is defined to be a quantum system
where 1) σ 0 is both an extension of ρ 0 and an extension of ρ 0 in H ⊗ H ; 2) Do = {F a,c |a ∈ A ∪ A and c ∈ C ∪ C } satisfies the following conditions:
• F a,c = I H⊗H if a ∈ A \ A and c ∈ C , or a ∈ A \ A and c ∈ C; • F a,c is a cylindrical extension of E a,c if a ∈ A and c ∈ C; • F a,c is a cylindrical extension of E a,c if a ∈ A and c ∈ C ;
3) M easure is the same as in Definition 5.1. Theorem 5.1 can be extended to a special class of generalised compositions of quantum systems. Recall from [16] that a density operator σ in H ⊗ H is said to be separable if we can write:
for all density operators σ on H ⊗ H . If operators F i commute, i.e. F i F j = F j F i for all i = j, and operators F i commute, then F is said to be commutative. Theorem 5.2: If and are compatible, and T is a generalised composition of S and S with a separable initial state σ 0 and commutative and separable super-operators F a,c (a ∈ A ∪ A , c ∈ C ∪ C ), then we have:
VI. ACCESS CONTROL
As an application of the quantum noninterference formalism developed in the previous sections, we now analyse security of access control to quantum information. To do so, we impose certain internal structure on the system under consideration by assuming that information is stored in different locations.
Definition 6.1: We say that the system S has structured states if there exists a set N of location names, and for each location name n ∈ N , there exists a Hilbert space H n such that
In other words, the quantum system S is a composed system that consists of component systems labeled by locations n ∈ N .
There is an essential difference between quantum and classical systems that makes understanding access control in a quantum system harder than that in a classical system. In a classical system, access control is usually defined by a matrix consisting of two functions "read" and "alter", specifying whether a given agent may "read", "alter", respectively, the information stored in given locations; for example, for each a ∈ A, read(a) is defined to be a subset of location names N , and it is the set of locations whose values can be read by agent a. The reasonableness of defining read(a) as a subset of N comes from an implicit assumption:
• "1 + 1 = 2": The ability to observe both the K subsystem (i.e. the subsystem consisting components labeled by n ∈ K) and the L subsystem implies the ability to observe the combined K∪L subsystem, where K, L ⊆ N . However, whenever this assumption is not valid, then read(a) must be defined as a subset of P(N ) instead of a subset of N , where we use P(·) to denote power set; for example, suppose that N = {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 }. If agent a is allowed to read both the values of location n 1 and n 2 but not the value of combined location n 1 n 2 , then read(a) = {{n 1 }, {n 2 }}; if agent a is allowed to read the values of location n 1 and n 2 as well as n 1 n 2 , then read(a) = {{n 1 }, {n 2 }, {n 1 , n 2 }}. Indeed, as already pointed out in the Introduction, the above "1 + 1 = 2" assumption is violated in the quantum world. This can be seen clearly from the next example. For simplicity, for any K ⊆ N , we write tr K for the partial trace tr n∈K Hn over the K subsystem. Example 6.1: There are density operators ρ, σ in H = n∈N H n such that 1) tr N \K (ρ) = tr N \K (σ) and tr N \L (ρ) = tr N \L (σ); but 2) tr N \(K∪L) (ρ) = tr N \(K∪L) (σ). In this case, an agent who can read both information stored in K and information stored in L but not information stored in K ∪ L is unable to distinguish ρ from σ. For instance, let N = {n 1 , n 2 }, and let H n1 = H n2 be the 2−dimensional Hilbert space H 2 . We put ρ = 1 2 (|00 00| + |11 11|), and σ = |β 00 β 00 |, where |β 00 = 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ) is the EPR pair. Then
but it is obvious that ρ = σ. Similarly, in the quantum world we know:
• The ability to change both the state of the K subsystem and the state of the L subsystem does not guarantee the ability to change the combined K ∪ L subsystem. This point can be explicitly shown by a simple example. To present this example, we need to introduce several notations. For any subset K ⊆ N and density operators ρ, σ in H = n∈N H n , if tr N \K (ρ) = tr N \L (σ), then we say that σ can be obtained from ρ by changing the state of the K subsystem and write ρ 
that is, there is density operator ρ in H such that ρ change K → σ and ρ change L → σ, but it does not hold that ρ change K∪L → σ. Indeed, this fact comes immediately from rephrasing Example 6.1.
We admit that the above discussion of changing the state of a subsystem is highly simplified. A more sophisticated discussion should be based on different choices of the entanglement transformations that we are allowing, e.g. local operations and classical communication (LOCC) (see [21] , Sec. 12.5.1), but it is far beyond the limit of space here. Another essential difference between quantum and classical information is that reading the quantum information stored in a certain location changes the information itself; but this difference will not be considered in this paper because in the noninterference formalism reading (by quantum measurements) always happens at the end, and thus the postmeasurement state of the system is irrelevant.
By the above observation, we realise that both read(a) and alter(a) should be defined as elements of P(P(N )). They can be simplified a little bit by noticing that if an agent can read (resp. alter) the value of locations K then it can read (resp. alter) the value of any subset L of K. A family B ∈ P(P(N )) of sets of location names is said to be below-closed if
We write P B (P(N )) for the set of all below-closed B ∈ P(P(N )). Definition 6.2: An access control matrix consists of: 1) a function read : A → P B (P(N )); and 2) a function alter : A → P B (P(N )).
For each agent a ∈ A, if K ∈ read(a), then the K subsystem can be observed by a; and if K ∈ alter(a), then the state of the K subsystem can be changed by a.
We now consider security of quantum access control with respect to a policy. Definition 6.3: An access control matrix (read, alter) satisfies security policy if
To present the quantum generalisation of Rushby's security theorem for access control [24] , we need to introduce a new pseudo-distance between density operators. For each agent a ∈ A, we define distance δ a by
for all reachable density operators ρ, σ in H = n∈N H n . Intuitively, δ a (ρ, σ) measures the difference between ρ and σ at the locations that agent a can observe. Note that in the defining equation of δ a , the supremum is taken over the distances d in some subspaces of H of different dimensions. From Eqs. (2) and (3) we see that the distances d does not depends on the dimensions of these subspaces, so this defining equation is not problematic.
Let > 0 and K ⊆ N . For any density operators ρ, σ ∈ H, if d(tr N \K (ρ), tr N \K (σ)) > , then we say that ρ and σ are −discriminable on K, and write Dis(ρ, σ| , K). Now we are ready to present the main result of this section, which gives a upper bound of bounded-time insecurity degree in terms of Reference Monitor Assumption and thus generalises Theorem 2 of [24] to the quantum case. Theorem 6.1: If the access control matrix satisfies policy and the Reference Monitor Assumptions: for all a ∈ A, for all c ∈ C, for all ρ, σ, and for all
then it holds that K t (S, ) ≤ θ + 2t .
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Universal Composable Quantum Security
Quantum security research started in 1980s with quantum cryptography which can achieve unconditional security in various cryptographic tasks that are impossible using only classical communication; for example quantum key distribution and quantum commitment. Now quantum cryptography have been developed into a broad area, including not only theoretical research but also physical implementations, and quantum cryptographic systems are already commercially available. The work in quantum cryptography closest to the present paper is the proof of universal composable security of quantum key distribution by Ben-Or et. al. [4] and Unruh's universal composable quantum multi-part computation [28] , [29] . We will focus on comparing our work with Unruh's paper [28] where he introduced a machine model for quantum multi-part computation that is similar to the automata model used in this paper. We first recall some definitions from [28] . Let {0, 1}
* stand for the set of finite strings of 0, 1. class ⊗H quant and the state of the system becomes a new ρ; 5) Repeat steps 3) and 4) indefinitely, say n times.
Suppose that the final state of the system is ρ n ; 6) Measure ρ n on H class in the computational basis and the outcome is w n . The output of a network N on input z ∈ {0, 1} * and security parameter k ≥ 0 is then a probability distribution Exec N (k, z) over {0, 1} * defined by:
P r[w n can be parsed as (environment, , out)]
for each out ∈ {0, 1} * . The above machine and network model and our automata model in Definition 3.1 are very similar. In both models, super-operators are employed to describe the basic actions of a system. But there are some minor differences between them: Firstly, the state Hilbert space in the above three definitions is infinite-dimensional, whereas the state Hilbert space in Definition 3.1 was assumed to be finite-dimensional. Secondly, the state space of a machine M is divided into three registers, namely H state M , H class and H quant . Thirdly, in a network N a measurement is performed on H class at each step and the outcome of the measurement determines the next execution step of N. In our automata model, however, measurements are performed only at the end of execution. After introducing quantum machine and network, Canetti's notion of universally composable security [5] can be naturally generalised to the quantum setting. A protocol is defined to be a special kind of network. We say that a protocol π emulates another protocol τ if π together with the environment and an adversary that can instruct corruption parties is indistinguishable from τ with the environment and a simulator. For two protocols π and σ, their composition σ π is defined to be a protocol where the machines from π and σ run together, and the machines from σ can access the inputs and outputs of the machines from π. Unruh [28] proved the universal composition theorem for quantum security: if π emulates τ , then σ π emulates σ τ for any protocol σ. The basic idea of our compositionality of security presented in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 is similar to Unruh's composition theorem, but technically they are quite different. Firstly, in Unruh's compositeion σ π communication is allowed between σ and π, whereas there is no communication between S and S in the composition S ⊗ S in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. Secondly, Unruh's composition only deals with qualitative security, however, quantitative composable security is presented in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 as an inequality of insecurity degrees.
B. Categorical Analysis of Quantum Information Flow
A new methodology for analysing quantum information flow was proposed by Abramsky and Coecke [1] , [2] by employing mathematical tools from category theory. Their approach is very different from the work presented in this paper. Firstly, the methodology of [1] , [2] has been developed at a higher-level of abstraction with a categorytheoretic recasting of axiomatisation of quantum mechanics, whereas we work at a lower-level with quantum automata as our system model. Secondly, the higher-level approach naturally means that the analysis of information flow in quantum systems given in [1] , [2] is qualitative, but our work presents a quantitative description of quantum information flow with the notion of noninterference degree.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The noninterference formalism of information-flow security is generalised to the quantum case. We define three insecurity degrees K(S, ), K t (S, ) and SK(S, ) of a quantum system modelled by a quantum automaton S with respect to a security policy . The unwinding technique for proving noninterference security is extended so that it can be used to give a upper bound of the insecurity degrees of quantum systems. A compositionality theorem for security of quantum systems is established, showing that the insecurity degree of a composite system does not exceed the sum of the insecurity degrees of its components.
For further research, one open question is to settle the computational complexity of the following problem: given a quantum system S, a security policy , and a rational constant c, decide whether K(S, ) < c, K t (S, ) < c, and SK(S, ) < c?
Only transitive noninterference for quantum systems is considered in this paper. As argued in [15] , [24] , transitive policies are too restrictive for many realistic applications, and since then intransitive noninterference for classical systems has been intensively studied; see for example [23] , [30] , [31] . So, another topic for further research is to define intransitive noninterference for quantum systems.
Noninterference was also defined by Focardi and Gorrieri [10] and Ryan and Schneider [22] in the framework of process algebras based on the notion of process equivalence. Several quantum processes have been defined in the last decade, including Jorrand and Lalire's QPAlg [17] , Gay and Nagarajan's CQP [11] and the authors' qCCS [8] , [9] , [33] . In particular, a bisimilarity preserved by parallel composition of quantum processes with entanglement was recently discovered by the authors [8] , [9] and Davidson [6] . A process equivalence-based quantum interference would also be an interesting topic.
